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Workmen's Compensation—Compensation for Off-Premises Work
Break Injury—Pacheco v. Orchids of Hawaii.'—Claimant's decedent
was killed in an automobile accident while driving from her employer's
premises to a bank at which she intended to cash her paycheck during
an unpaid coffee break. The sole restriction which the employer placed
upon coffee breaks was a fifteen-minute time limitation. On the day in
question, the deceased had been ordered to work overtime, and thus
would have been unable to cash her check after working hours. The
supervisor had seen the deceased and three co-employees leave the
employment premises together and cautioned them to hurry so as to
return within fifteen minutes. The decedent's dependents filed a claim
for compensation before the Director of the Department of Labor and
Industrial Relations.
The Supreme Court of Hawaii, in affirming a decision for the
claimant by the state Labor and Industrial Relations Appeals Board,'
HELD: that decedent's death was caused by accidental injury "arising
out of and in the course of the employment," 3 and thus the dependent
claimants were entitled to recover under the state's workmen's com-
pensation act. 4 The court reached this result by adopting the general
rule that "an employee, who is allowed to venture off-premises during
an authorized work break, and who is injured in the course of reason-
able and necessary activity incidental to such break,"° comes within
the purview of the statute.
A discussion of the issues presented in Pacheco requires a brief
preliminary statement of the general policies of workmen's compensa-
tion. Workmen's compensation legislation was enacted in most states
in the early 1900's to correct the inadequacies of the common law tort
remedies in providing satisfactory relief to the victims of industrial
accidents.° Under the tort doctrines of contributory negligence, the
fellow servant rule,' and assumption of risk,' it was extremely difficult
for an injured employee or his survivors to recover against an employer.
As a result, an injured employee was often a potential member of the
welfare rolls.° Workmen's compensation legislation, in seeking to rem-
edy the inadequacies of the common law, established a no fault doctrine
of recovery for employment-related injuries. Employers were required
by statute to purchase workmen's compensation insurance, the costs of
I — Hawaii —, 502 P.2d 1399 (1972),
2 The Appeals Board had reversed the Director's denial of compensation. Id. at 1400.
8 Hawaii Rev. Stat. § 386-3 (1968).
4 502 P.2d at 1401.
n Id.
For a more detailed account of the historical development of workmen's compensa-
tion law, see 1 A. Larson, The Law of Workmen's Compensation §§ 4-5 (1972); W.
Prosser, Law of Torts §§ 81-82 (3d ed. 1964).
T This rule provided that an employer was not liable for employee injuries caused
by the negligence of another employee. Prosser, supra note 6, § 81.
8 The employee was said to have assumed the risk of injury by taking the job. Id,
9 1 A. Larson, supra note 6, § 2.20.
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which were passed on to the consuming public--"The cost of the prod-
uct should bear the blood of the workman.""
The workmen's compensation acts of forty-one of the fifty states" .
and the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act"
provide that compensation is to be awarded for personal injuries "aris-
ing out of and in the course of employment."" The courts, as a general
rule, have interpreted this statutory language to require that a substan-
tial degree of "work relatedness" be attached to the activity in which
the injury is incurred." Courts differ as to what constitutes a work
related activity. Most jurisdictions have found no work relatedness in
an off-premises activity unless there is benefit to the employer from the
activity or control by the employer over the activity." To generalize
further, however, would be quite meaningless, since this area of the
case law is filled with fine distinctions based on individual fact situa-
tions.
A clear illustration of the problems that arise in applying the
work relatedness test in an off-premises workmen's compensation case
is the situation in which an employee, is injured or killed during a work
break while off the employer's premises. A substantial majority of the
jurisdictions have denied compensation in this situation." In a minority
of jurisdictions, however, a trend has been developing toward allowing
compensation for off-premises work break injuries. Pacheco v. Orchids
of Hawaii" is a significant development in this trend because it broad-
ens the concept of work relatedness further than ever before, by grant-
ing compensation in a situation in which the employee used her break
for a personal errand rather than for refreshment or relaxation. The
10 Of unknown origin, quoted by Prosser, supra note 6, § 81.
11
 See 1 A. Larson, supra note 6, § 6.10.
12 33 U.S.C. § 902(2) (1970).
15
 The other states have statutes containing substantially similar language. See, e.g.,
Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-44 (1953): "injuries arising out of or in the course of employ-
ment"; N.D. Cent. Code § 65-01-02 (1960): "injuries arising in the course of employ-
ment"; Wis. Stat. § 102.03(1) (c)1 (Supp. 1972): "injuries growing out of and incidental
to his employment." Under the statutes of the majority of the states, the injury must
arise both out of and in the course of employment. This note will not concern itself
with these distinctions since the actual results are for the most part the same despite the
language differences. For a fuller discussion of these distinctions see Fisher, Injuries Aris-
ing Out Of and In the Course of Employment, 26 Mo. L. Rev. 278 (1961). See also 1 A.
Larson, supra note 6, chs. III-IV.
14 See 1 A. Larson, supra note 6, §§ 7, 14.00.
15
 Compensation denied because no employer benefit found: see, e.g., Kunce v. Junge
Baking Co., 432 S.W.2d 602, 610 (Mo. App. 1968); Scott v. Industrial Comm'n, 62 Ohio
L. Abs. 11, 13-14, 105 N.E.2d 881, 883 (Ct. App. 1951). Compensation denied because no
employer control found: see, e.g., Union Camp v. Blackmon, — Ala. —, 270 So.2d 108, 110
(1972); Salmon v. Bagley Laundry Co., 344 Mich. 471, 475, 74 N.W.2d 1, 3 (1955).
A rule that often limits compensation to on-premises injuries is the "going and com-
ing" rule which provides that off-premises injuries are not compensable when incurred by
an employee while going to or coming from work.
10 E.g., Union Camp v. Blackmon, — Ala. —, 270 So. 2d 108 (1972); Salmon v.
Bagley Laundry Co., 344 Mich. 471, 74 N.W.2d 1 (1955).
ti 502 P.2d 1399.
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court attempted to justify its holding by squeezing the . fact situation
into the confines of one of the theories developed by minority jurisdic-
tions to circumvent the majority rule.'
This note will examine the Pacheco majority and dissenting opin-
ions in light of the trend toward compensating off-premises work break
injuries. Throughout this examination, the various rationales utilized
by courts to find sufficient work relatedness in off-premises activities
will be appraised. Finally, a recommendation will be made for the wide-
spread adoption of the rule that compensation be awarded for short
off-premises work break injuries, provided that the employer has con-
sented to the break and that the activity is not unusual or unreasonable.
Because this was an issue of first impression in Hawaii, the Pacheco
decision relied in great measure upon certain holdings of the New York
courts." Those courts have adopted a very liberal policy regarding the
award of compensation for off-premises work break injuries, basing
their holdings on the notion that a short off-premises break does not
interrupt the employment relationship. Caporale v. Department of
Taxation & Finance20 allowed compensation for an injury sustained
during a short off-premises break. The Caporale court held that em-
ployment had not been interrupted because (1) the authority of the
employer continued during the break; (2) the break was of brief dura-
tion; and (3) the distance traveled from the employment premises was
not great 21 Caporale was followed by Bodensky v. Royaltone, Inc., 22
the case principally cited by the Pacheco majority, in which recovery
was allowed in a factual situation similar to that in Pacheco. An em-
ployee was injured while crossing a street during an employer-approved
fifteen-minute coffee break. The court noted that departures from the
employment premises to satisfy personal comfort were increasingly
prevalent during coffee breaks, and that such breaks could not today
be called separations from employment, especially when the custom is
18 See State Compensation Ins. Fund v. Workmen's Compensation Appeals Bd., 67
Cal. 2d 925, 434 P.2d 619, 64 Cal. Rptr. 323 (1967); Sweet v. Kolosky, 259 Minn. 253,
106 N.W.2d 908 (1960); Whitehurst v. Rainbo Baking Co., 70 N.M. 468, 374 P.2d 849
(1962); Caporale v. Department of Taxation & Finance, 2 App. Div. 2d 91, 153 N.Y.S.2d
738 (1956), aff'd, 2 N.Y.2d 946, 142 N.E.2d 213, 162 N.Y.S.2d 40 (1957); Desautel v.
Workmen's Compensation Bureau, 72 N.D.2d 35, 4 N.W.2d 581 (1942); Jordan v.
Western Elec. Co., 1 Ore. App. 441, 463 P.2d 598 (1970); Van Roy v. Industrial Comm'n,
5 Wis. 2d 416, 92 N.W.2d 818 (1958).
10 The New York decisions, of course, do not enjoy a precedential status in Hawaii.
New York, however, a largely populated industrialized state, has many decisions on the
specific issue of the compensability of off-premises work break injuries, and was the first
state to enact workmen's compensation legislation. See 1 A. Larson, supra note 6, § 5.20.
20 2 App. Div. 2d 91, 153 N.Y.S.2d 738 (1956), aff'd, 2 N.Y.2d 946, 142 N.E.2d 213,
162 N.Y.S.2d 40 (1957).
21 Id. at 92, 153 N.Y.S.2d at 740. In two brief per curiam decisions, the New York
Appellate Division had allowed recovery for off-premises work break injuries. Rucker v.
Nassau-Beekman Realty Corp., 272 App. Div. 982, 73 N.Y.S.2d 275 (1947); Sullivan's
Estate v. Motor Realty Corp., 272 App. Div. 986, 73 N.Y.S.2d 276 (1947).
22 5 App. Div. 2d 733, 168 N.Y.S.2d 908 (1957).
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known by the employer. 23
 Thus the New York courts have enunciated
three clear standards for determining whether a break is part of the
employment situation. The facts of Pacheco clearly meet these criteria
as set forth in Caporale
—the break was brief; the employee went only
a few blocks from the plant; and the employer consented to the trip."
However, the dissent in Pacheco would have disallowed the claim
on the basis of Balsam v. Division of Employment, 25
 another New York
case, which denied compensation to a claimant who was permitted by
his employer to go to a particular coffee shop during his fifteen-minute
break, but who instead went to cash a check at a bank, where he slipped
on the floor and injured himself. The court declined to extend the
Caporale rule to a situation in which an "employee when injured had
deviated from a prescribed sphere of recreational endeavor to embark
upon a purely personal mission." 28
 The dissent in Pacheco maintained
that Mrs. Pacheco had deviated from the prescribed sphere of the coffee
break by going to the bank. The majority, on the other hand, distin-
guished Balsam quite adequately: in Pacheco, the employee could go
wherever she pleased during the break so long as she returned to work
on time, whereas in Balsam consent was only given for the employee
to go to a designated coffee shop." This distinction is a valid one be-
cause in the case of a prescribed course of conduct the boundaries of
the employment situation have been predetermined by the employer
and made a part of the working conditions. 28
The dissent in Pacheco was willing to allow compensation for an
off-premises coffee break, provided the break was actually used for
refreshment or relaxation. It argued, however, that activity incidental
to the coffee break, i.e., activity not undertaken directly pursuant to
obtaining refreshment or relaxation, should not be compensated. In so
contending, the dissent stated: "Drinking coffee or relaxing during a
coffee break is itself one step removed from employment. A trip to a
bank to cash a paycheck during a coffee break is still another step
removed. In my view, a line must be drawn at this point." 28
 The dissent
28 Id. at 733, 168 N.Y.S.2d at 909.
24 The dissent argued that there was no evidence that the supervisor knew where
the deceased was going, and thus did not really consent. 502 P.2d at 1403. However, it
could be argued that there was implied consent in that the deceased could go wherever
she pleased during the break.
28 24 App. Div. 2d 802, 263 N.Y.S.2d 849 (1965).
20 Id. at 803, 263 N.Y.S.2d at 850.
27 502 P.2d at 1401.
28 The distinction, however, may not be so clear-cut in reality. An employer might
allow off-premises breaks, prescribing a particular restaurant, but in practice might know
of and tolerate the custom of employees going other places. Arguably, there is implied
employer consent in this situation, placing the case in line with Pacheco and Bodensky,
Perhaps Pacheco and Balsam would be analogous if the decedent in the former had been
killed after the fifteen-minute limitation on her coffee break had expired, for then she
would have deviated from a prescribed course of conduct.
28 502 P.2d at 1406.
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attempted to emphasize the necessity of applying this remoteness test
to an individual's activities during a coffee break by maintaining that
the majority decision would permit recovery where an employee injured
himself sky-diving or drag racing during his coffee break. The unlikeli-
hood of these examples detracts from the validity of the point being
made—namely, that in a number of cases employees may engage in
unusual or unexpected activities during their breaks." The dissent was
concerned that the majority decision would open the floodgates by
allowing compensation when the employee is injured in bizarre, danger-
ous off-premises activity. This problem of lawful but dangerous off-
premises break activity is discussed by Larson in his treatise on
workmen's compensation. Larson points out that an employee might
be barred from recovery if he engages in unusual or unreasonable
activity while engaged in something incidental to employment, but not
while directly in performance of work duties." Activities such as sky-
diving or drag racing could be described as unusual or unreasonable
on a coffee break—an event incidental to employment—but it is highly
questionable whether going to the bank to cash a paycheck would.
A further concern of the dissent is that the majority holding will
have the opposite of its intended effect." Employees will lose rather
than gain from the decision because employers, desiring lower work-
men's compensation insurance premiums, will henceforth limit off-
premises coffee breaks to a particular restaurant. Employees will lose
the freedom to go wherever they wish during coffee breaks, a freedom
which the dissent considered very important." While the dissent's
argument is not without merit, it appears doubtful that insurance rates
would be appreciably higher in jurisdictions following Pacheco than
elsewhere. No substantially greater risk is incurred in driving to a bank
to cash a paycheck than in driving to a restaurant for a cup of coffee."
It is questionable whether a decision against recovery should be justified
on such speculative grounds. Furthermore, it would be a violation of
the strong policy in favor of compensating workers" upon which work-
men's compensation is based to deny a deserving employee compensa-
tion because of possible increases in insurance rates.
8° Recently, a couple was married during the groom's coffee break. N.Y. Times, Mar.
25, 1973, at 46, col. 7,
31 1 A. Larson, supra note 6, # 21.80. Larson states that although courts do this,
they seldom expressly declare that they are doing it. Id. at 21.81. Under workmen's
compensation doctrine, an employee can recover for an injury, even if it results from un-
reasonable or unusual practices, provided it is incurred while in direct performance of
employment duties. Id. at § 21.80. Activity in performance of employment duties by
definition arises out of and in the course of employment.
32 502 P.2d at 1406-07,
83 "Employees are not machines to be limited to such a narrow gauge." Id. at 1407.
84 The expense of workmen's compensation insurance is on the average only one
percent of the payroll expenses. An increase in premiums for compensating off-premises
injuries could only be a fraction of this one percent. Report of the National Commission
on State Workmen's Compensation Laws, ch. 7, gal. 13 (1972).
BD See id. at ch. 1, gal. 10.
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In Pacheco, the majority further bolstered its decision by finding
that the employer derived a benefit from the employee's off-premises
coffee break. In a number of cases allowing compensation for off-
premises injuries, the employee had performed some service for the
employer's benefit while off the premises. 3° Analogizing from these cases,
courts have argued that an employee who is permitted a coffee break
performs his work more efficiently because he is rested and his morale
has been uplifted by the interruption from the work's routine." Those
jurisdictions that have refused to adopt this argument have done so on
the theory that the employee is acting entirely on his own, with no
control imposed upon him by the employer."
An argument that the employer derived a benefit from Mrs.
Pacheco's trip to the bank would appear tenuous. The court, however,
suggested that an employee who utilizes a coffee break to attend to
pressing personal business is able to perform better at his job because
his mind is freed of the anxiety which would have disturbed him had he
not taken care of the matter. As the dissent points out, this argument
could lead to excessive results." For example, an employee might de-
rive peace of mind leading to more efficient work performance by at-
tending to certain business of a personal nature during the weekend.
Clearly, injury incurred in such activity would not be compensable.
Or an employee might injure himself falling out of bed while asleep at
night. Although an employee needs sufficient sleep to be a satisfactory
worker, recovery assuredly would be out of the question."
The majority also found a substantial benefit accruing to the
employer in the fact that the entire plant shut down for fifteen minutes
so that all the employees could break at once. The logic behind this
argument is somewhat tortured: (1) the employer benefits from the
increased productivity of workers who are refreshed by coffee breaks,
and (2) it would be an inconvenience, or added expense, if the employ-
ees went for breaks at different times of the day, as there would be
86 E.g., Malinski v. Industrial Comm'n, 6 Ariz. App. 387, 433 P.2d 38 (1967); see
generally 1 A. Larson, supra note 6, § 16, 18.
87
 For an interesting illustration of the benefits that an employer can derive by per-
mitting, or in fact ordering, his employees to take a coffee break, see Mitchell v. Greinetz,
235 F.2d 621, 625 (10th Cir. 1956), where the court stated:
We may well take judicial knowledge of the fact .	 that coffee breaks or short
rest periods are rapidly becoming an accepted part of employment generally.
While no doubt they are beneficial to the employees, they are equally beneficial
to the employer in that they promote more efficiency and result in greater out-
put, and that this increased production is one of the primary factors, if not the
prime factor, which leads the employer to institute such break periods.
88 Greenfield v. Manufacturers Cas. Co., 198 Tenn. 452, 281 S.W.2d 47 (1955) (em-
ployee eating meal in restaurant afforded no business benefit to employer); see Hedge-
wood v. H.A. Pittman, 471 P.2d 888 (Okla. 1970) (claimant who went out to street to
turn off car headlights which were accidentally left on stretches employer benefit argu-
ment too far in maintaining that anxiety about lights would have interfered with work
performance).
BO 502 P.2d at 1404.
48 This latter example is Larson's. 1 A. Larson, supra note 6, § 15.53.
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sporadic interruptions in the flow of operations. Therefore, by stopping
the entire production line for fifteen minutes, the employer gains the
benefit of (1) and avoids the detriment of (2). Although each of these
propositions may be individually true, it hardly follows from their
combination that Mrs. Pacheco's coffee break benefited the employer
because he found it more convenient to let everyone break simultane-
ously.
A few courts have found an employer benefit justifying the award
of compensation where the employer had a special arrangement with
a bank for cashing the employees' paychecks during break time. In
Watson v. American Can Co., 41 the claimant was injured while return-
ing from a bank where she had cashed her paycheck during her lunch
break. The employer had at one time paid its employees in cash. Follow-
ing a payroll robbery, the company arranged payment by check with a
particular bank, which hired extra personnel during the lunch period
on payday. Compensation' was awarded because the employer was said
to have gained a benefit by avoiding the risk of payroll robbery in
paying by check and the special arrangement with the bank was part
of the scheme of gaining this employer benefit. Watson was followed by
Flamholtz v. Byrde, Richards, & Pound, Inc.," where the employee
was injured on the way to cash a paycheck at a bank at which the
employer provided signature cards to facilitate the process. Employer
benefit justifying compensation was found in the arrangement enabling
the company bookkeeper to avoid the necessity of carrying large
amounts of cash. Pacheco is distinguishable from these cases, in that
there was no pre-arrangement between the employer and a particular
bank.
Still other situations in which some courts have found an employer
benefit are those in which the employee was required to work overtime
(as was the deceased in Pacheco) or in which the conditions of work
are so pressing that the mealtime break is impinged upon. In Clark v.
Employers Liability Assurance Corp.," the employee, having had to
stay overtime because of uncompleted work, was injured in a motor-
cycle accident while traveling to a restaurant for supper. The court
stated: "When he left the repair shop with his work unfinished in order
to get a meal necessary for carrying on his work into the night, plaintiff
was doing something in furtherance of his job and his employer's
business."44 In Vaughn v. Highlands Underwriters Insurance Co.," the
employee, a truck driver, had to work a fifteen-hour shift. Normally, he
ate on the road, but on the day in question he was delayed at the em-
ployment premises because the plant assembly line was broken down.
41 23 App. Div. 2d 423, 261 N.Y.S.2d 306 (1965), aff'd, 18 N.Y.2d 758, 221 N.E.2d
463, 274 N.Y.S.2d 683 (1966).
42 37 App. Div. 2d 645, 322 N.Y.S.2d 382 (1971).
48
 27 Sold 464 (La. App. 1946).
44 Id. at 466.
45 445 S.W.2d 234 (Tex. Ct. Civ. App. 1969).
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His supervisor told him to go out and eat, whereupon he was injured
on the way to a cafe. The court deemed it necessary for the welfare
of the business that the employee be afforded an opportunity to eat,
especially where the sojourn was undertaken at the direction of the
supervisor. 40
 The rationale of these decisions seems to be that the
employee is eating a non-scheduled meal in circumstances where his
normal eating time has been superseded by work exigencies. This ra-
tionale was a factor in Pacheco, although not a controlling one, in that
the deceased could not cash her check after work because she was
required to work overtime, Her coffee break was the only time she had
that day in which to do it. Other courts have refused to hold that an
off-premises meal taken under these circumstances arises out of and
in the course of employment any more than any other off-premises
meal." The distinction is not a major one. An employee might have
to eat an off-premises meal if he has to work overtime; likewise, he
might normally eat an off-premises lunch or supper in the regular course
of affairs. The difference in the overtime situation is that a special
employment exigency forces the employee to eat at a restaurant, when
he might normally have returned home.
The broadest rule permitting workmen's compensation recovery
for injuries incurred in activity not directly related to employment,
whether on or off the premises, is the personal comfort doctrine. In-
cluded within the scope of this rule are such activities as eating,"
getting a drink of water, resting, washing, smoking, seeking fresh air,
coolness, or warmth—and taking a coffee break." Although various
theories have been advanced in explanation of the doctrine, policy con-
siderations are probably the most important. One writer has stated:
"The real reason [for the personal comfort doctrine] is that a working
man must live and recognizing this, the employer has provided both
physical conveniences and the opportunity to enjoy their use. Modern
industrial conditions provide the real basis for compensation and should
be recognized."5°
Courts do not generally apply the personal comfort doctrine to
injuries incurred off the employment premises G 1
 However, if an em-
ployee is to be compensated for on-premises personal comfort related
injuries, there is no obvious reason why off-premises activities are any
less relevant to personal comfort.52 In Van Roy v. Industrial Commis-
40 Id. at 237.
47
 See Jamison v. Temporary Comm'n on Agriculture, 308 N.Y. 683, 124 N.E.2d 321
(1954); Greenfield v. Manufacturers Cas. Co., 198 Tenn. 452, 281 S.W.2d 47 (1955).
48
 The eating referred to is that which takes place while the employee is at the work
locus, taking a momentary pause from actual work.
40 See generally Comment, Workmen's Compensation: The Personal Comfort Doc-
trine, 1960 Wis. L. Rev. 91, 92.
60 Id. at 98.
51 Cf. 1 A. Larson, supra note 6, 21.21a.
52 See Comment, supra note 49, at 105.
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sion," the Wisconsin court applied the personal comfort doctrine to an
off-premises work break injury. The court reasoned that accidents aris-
ing out of activities incidental to employment are compensable as activ-
ities ministering to personal comfort are incidental to employment." So
long as the employee's activity does not amount to a deviation removing
the employee from the employment relationship, his act is incidental
to employment." The court then held that off-premises trips for coffee
or other refreshment, when consented to by the employer or supervisor,
are not deviations from employment." Van Roy expressly rejected the
ground often relied upon by courts to deny off-premises awards, i.e.,
that the employer has no control over the employee in such circum-
stances.°T
California has also adopted a policy of allowing compensation for
off-premises work break injuries, relying in part upon the personal
comfort doctrine. In Western Greyhound Lines v. Industrial Accident
Commission," a woman bus driver was assaulted while drinking coffee
between trips in a restaurant across the street from the bus terminal.
The court stated that acts for an employee's personal comfort, even if
performed off-premises, do not interrupt the continuity of employ-
ment." The court also pointed to (1) the benefit that the employer
derived by the bus driver's refreshing herself; (2) the fact that the
employer was aware that the employees customarily ate in this res-
taurant; and (3) the fact that the employee was being paid for the
break time.°° The fact that coffee was available at the terminal canteen
was deemed irrelevant by the court 61
Although the majority in Pacheco did not expressly refer to the
personal comfort doctrine, it could have drawn on some of the reason-
ing behind the rule. A court hearing a workmen's compensation case
should begin with the basic assumption that a working man or woman
53 5 Wis. 2d 416, 92 N.W.2d 818 (1958).
64 Id, at 421, 92 N.W.2d at 821.
65 Id. at 422, 92 N.W.2d at 821.
66 Id. at 424, 92 N.W.2d at 822.
57 Id. at 423, 92 N.W.2d at 822. New Mexico has adopted a policy similar to Wis-
consin's in Whitehurst v. Rainbo Baking Co., 70 N.M. 468, 374 P.2d 849 (1962), and
Sullivan v. Rainbo Baking Co., 71 N.M. 9, 375 P.2d 326 (1962).
00 225 Cal. App. 2d 517, 37 Cal. Rptr. 580 (1964).
00 Id. at 520, 37 Cal. Rptr. at 582. See also State Compensation Ins. Fund v. Work-
men's Compensation Appeals Bd., 67 Cal. 2d 925, 434 P.2d 619, 64 Cal. Rptr. 323 (1967),
in which the California Supreme Court allowed compensation for an off-premises work
break swimming accident primarily on the basis of the personal comfort doctrine.
60 225 Cal. App. 2d at 519-21, 37 Cal. Rptr. at 581-82. See also Jordan v. Western
Elec. Co., 1 Ore. App. 441, 463 P.2d 598 (1970), in which compensation was allowed be-
cause the off-premises break was on paid time; the foreman knew about it but did not
forbid it (thus impliedly consenting) ; employees customarily took such breaks; and, the
employer derived a benefit from the break. The personal comfort doctrine was referred to.
01 225 Cal. App. 2d at 520, 37 Cal. Rptr. at 582. It was noted that there was evidence
that the coffee offered at the canteen often was of poor quality. The court in Pacheco
also apparently did not place any importance on the fact that refreshment facilities were
located on the premises.
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"has to live," and that there are certain activities which are part of the
work experience. A trip to the coffee shop is recognized as such an
activity and, it is submitted, a trip to a bank to cash one's paycheck
should be recognized as another.
In addition to the employer benefit theory and the personal comfort
doctrine, some courts have found sufficient work relatedness to award
compensation for an off-premises work break injury by using a contract
theory. In Sweet v. Kolosky,°2 an employee injured himself in a fall
on the way to a drug store for coffee during a coffee break. The written
employment agreement provided that employees could take two fifteen-
minute coffee breaks per day, one in the morning and one in the after-
noon. Employees customarily went to the drug store because there were
no on-premises refreshment facilities. The court awarded compensation
because the only way the employee could enjoy his contractual right
to a coffee break was to go off-premises.
In Pacheco, the employer's policy was to allow fifteen-minute
breaks during which the employee was free to go off-premises, although
refreshment facilities were present on the premises. Thus, in Pacheco
it would seem that the employee had only a privilege to go off-premises
as opposed to the contractual right which existed in Kolosky. Further-
more, it was not necessary to go off-premises in Pacheco, as it was in
Kolosky, because of the existence of on-premises refreshment facilities.
Narrowly interpreted, Kolosky would limit recovery to situations in
which the employee had a contractual right rather than a privilege to
go off-premises. It can be argued that more work relatedness is present
when there is a right because the employer is contractually bound to
honor it.°3
A broader reading of the contract theory used in Kolosky would
permit recovery if the accident arose out of activities expressly or im-
pliedly contemplated by the employment contract." It is submitted
that every employment contract expressly or impliedly permits an em-
ployee to do what his employer consents to. Thus if the employer con-
sents to the off-premises break, compensation should be allowed because
the contract contemplates that the employee will enjoy privileges which
the employer grants him. This is a very broad theory of recovery, and
would include the Pacheco situation. It seems, however, that the
Kolosky court would limit recovery to situations in which the break
is a contractual right. It explicitly stated that compensation should be
62 259 Minn. 253, 106 N.W.2d 908 (1960).
ea See Reinert v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 46 Cal. 2d 349, 294 P.2d 713 (1956),
in which an employee of a summer camp was awarded compensation for an off-premises
injury incurred while horseback riding, because the use of this facility was part of the
employee's compensation. The court noted that the employee necessarily would travel
beyond the employment premises if she took advantage of this right.
64
 Sec Union Camp v. Blackmon, — Ala. —, 270 So.2d 108, 113 (1972) (dissenting
opinion); Desautel v. Workmen's Compensation Bureau, 72 N.D. 35, 4 N.W.2d 581
(1942).
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denied where the employee's excursion has no relation to his rights and
privileges under the employment contract."
The contract theory and the personal comfort doctrine provide
alternative rationales to the one used by the court in Pacheco for a
broad-based rule allowing off-premises work break injury compensa-
tion. It is submitted that the Pacheco rationale is the preferable ap-
proach because it is more direct in permitting recovery where "an
employee is allowed to venture off-premises during an authorized work
break, and who is injured in the course of reasonable and necessary
activity incidental to such break."" Rather than depend on the theory
that the break is an incident of the employment contract, or that the
break is a matter of personal comfort, or that the employer derived a
benefit from the break, it is more sensible and direct to simply allow
recovery for short off-premises breaks on a per se basis, provided that
they are consented to by the employer and the employee does not
engage in unreasonable or unusual activity. Insofar as the Pacheco
decision relies on the employer benefit theory, it weakens the thrust
of its argument. As discussed above, the court is forced to stretch this
theory inordinately to encompass the facts of the case."
Many considerations weigh in favor of the approach set forth
above. Coffee breaks have become an institution for the American
worker. A worker on such a break does not really consider his employ-
ment relationship to be terminated while he temporarily goes off-
premises for refreshment or on an errand. The reasons for drawing the
line of compensation protection at the employer's threshold when the
employee arrives or departs at the beginning and end of the day" are
not present in the work break situation. When an employee departs
from work, his work day has ended. He is as free from the work rela-
tionship as he can be. If the line were not drawn at the employer's
threshold, difficult problems would ensue as to when the period of
compensation coverage began or ended." This line drawing problem is
not present in the work break situation because a line need not be drawn
at all if a general rule is adopted allowing compensation for short off-
premises activities which are consented to by the employer and which
are not unreasonable or unusual.
With the exception of eight states," the general rule is adhered
to that off-premises work break injuries are noncompensable. The un-
favorable consequence of this rule is that employees injured in such
situations are in danger of becoming dependents of public welfare."
The policy of workmen's compensation should be to protect as many
65 259 Minn. at 256, 106 N.W.2d at 910-11.
00 502 P.2d at 1401.
07 See discussion in text at notes 39-40 supra.
68 See note 15 supra.
0° An example of such a Iine-drawing problem would arise when the employee does
not go directly home from work.
70 See note 18 supra.
71 See note 9 supra.
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workers as possible so that such a result may be avoided, and thus
the widespread adoption of the liberal rule here enunciated is desirable.
Another desirable policy is national uniformity of workmen's com-
pensation law. Conflicts of law problems can arise if an employee has
contacts with more than one jurisdiction and recovery is allowed in one
and barred in the other. It was easier for the court in Pacheco to adopt
the rule that it did because the case was one of first impression in
Hawaii. Other states with entrenched histories of following the majority
rule against off-premises injury compensation are less likely to follow
the liberal trend.
A major step toward national uniformity in adopting the liberal
rule would result from the implementation of the recommendations of
the Report of the National Commission on State Workmen's Compensa-
tion Laws. 72 The Report, concerned with all branches of workmen's
compensation law, finds that existing state workmen's compensation laws
are proving inadequate and suggests the appointment of a new commis-
sion to encourage and assist the states in adopting the recommendations
of the Report." Further, the Report suggests that if by 1975 the states
have not significantly adopted the most essential of the recommenda-
tions, Congress should enact legislation designed to guarantee compli-
ance,'" The Report does not specifically recommend that a rule favoring
compensation for off-premises work break injuries be adopted. The
Report does state that "[d]esigners of a program which covers work-
related injuries ... must decide where and how to draw the line between
those which are and those which are not work-related."" It goes on to
say that although the states have adopted conflicting interpretations of
the phrase "arising out of and in the course of" in many areas where
the issue arises (one of which is the off-premises work break situation),
"it is impossible to devise a tidy rule which will end the controversies." 7°
However, this impossibility does not apply to the work break situation.
The adoption of a recommendation that off-premises work break in-
juries of a limited duration be compensable, when the employer con-
sented to the break and when the activity engaged in by the employee
is not unusual or unreasonable, ought to be considered by the Commis-
sion. Such a recommendation might not be considered essential by the
Commission, and accordingly state compliance might not be made
compulsory. (The Commission thinks that all its recommendations are
important but that only some are essential, and compliance should be
mandatory only for the essential recommendations.)" Yet the adoption
of such a recommendation would be likely to have a significant impact
72 Report of the National Commission on State Workmen's Compensation Laws
(1972).
78 Id. at ch. 7, gal. 18.
74 Id. at ch. 7, gals. 20-21.
75 Id. at ch. 2, gal. 10.
70 Id. at ch. 2, gal. 12.
77 Id. at ch. 7, gal. 19,
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upon future state legislation and court decisions, owing to the prestige
and authority over desirable policy which the Commission possesses.
In conclusion, a court desiring to extend workmen's compensation
coverage to an off-premises work break injury could reach such a re-
sult by relying on the employer benefit theory, the personal comfort
doctrine, or the contract theory. Alternatively, rather than stretch a
fact situation to fit one of these theories, a court could simply announce
the general rule that a short off-premises break that is consented to by
the employer and that is not unusual or unreasonable is part of the
work relationship. It is submitted that this latter alternative is the more
desirable because it is more consistent with a liberal policy in favor of
compensating injured workers, and because in recent years work breaks
have in fact become a part of the work relationship. It is further sub-
mitted that the National Commission on State Workmen's Compensa-
tion Laws should adopt a recommendation in favor of this rule, since
such a proposal would encourage the extension of the liberal trend.
ARNOLD E. COHEN
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure—Discovery—Denial of Discovery
Pertaining to Subject Matter Jurisdiction and Standing—Mandamus
as a Means of Review—Investment Properties International, Ltd.
v. 105, Ltd.'—Investment Properties International, a Canadian cor-
poration, and its subsidiaries brought an action for damages against
the respondents, IOS, also a Canadian corporation, and its subsidiaries
in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New
York.2 The complaint alleged violations of section 10(b) of the Securi-
ties Exchange Act of 19343 and Rule 1013-5 promulgated thereunder, 4
as well as violations of the Sherman Antitrust Act.° Plaintiffs' request
for a preliminary injunction was denied on the grounds that it was un-
likely that plaintiffs would be able to establish standing and subject
matter jurisdiction. Plaintiffs thereupon sought to depose certain officers
of the defendants, the examination to be limited to the threshold issues
of standing and subject matter jurisdiction. The district court, on mo-
tion by defendants, vacated plaintiffs' notice of deposition "without
prejudice to further discovery if it is determined that this Court has
jurisdiction of the subject matter of this action." Plaintiffs then sought
1 459 F.2d 705 (2d Cir. 1972). The factual description of the case given in the text
relies in part on the report of the denial of plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction
in [1970-1971 Transfer Binder] CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. A 93,011 (S.D.N.Y., April 21,
1971).
2 The district court opinion is unreported. The text follows the summary of the case
in 459 F.2d at 706.
8 15 U.S.C. 4 78j(b) (1970).
4 17 C.F.R.	 240.10b-5 (1972).
15 U.S.C. § 1-7 (1970).
0 As quoted by the court of appeals in 459 F.2d at 707.
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